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Abstract
Online reviews are potent sources for industry owners and buyers, however, oppor-
tunistic people may try to destruct or promote their desired product by publishing fake
comments named spam opinion. So far, many models have been developed to detect
spam opinions, but none have addressed the issue of spam attacks. It is a way a smart
spammer can deceive the system in a manner in which he can continue generating
spams without the fear of being detected and blocked by the system. In this paper, the
spam attacks are discussed. Moreover, a robust graph-based spam detection method
is proposed. The method respectively estimates honesty, trust and reliability values of
reviews, reviewers, and products considering possible deception scenarios. The paper
also presents the efficiency of the proposed method as compared to other graph-based
methods through some case studies.
Keywords: Spam Attack, Spam Detection, Spam Opinion, Deception, Robustness.
1. Introduction
Due to the importance of users’ reviews on social networks and commercial web-
sites, many malicious people are struggling to meet their false goals by publishing false
opinions. Some of them are trying to promote their non quality goods; others are trying
to destroy the quality of their competitors. Thus, researchers have been working since
2007 to provide an appropriate solution to identify spam reviews [10].
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In spam detection systems, deception means those so called spam attackers who are
aware of the existence of the spam detection method and its mechanism, mislead the
system and bypass the mechanism to spread opinion spams according to its malicious
goals. For example, in a repeat-based method (e.g.[11]), if spam attackers are aware of
the system’s method, they can easily deceive the system by collecting data from unique
and non repetitive reviews. As a further instance, in text-based systems [18, 20], if the
spam attackers are aware of what the words are as a benchmark for spam recognition,
they can deceive the system by avoiding their choice.
Robustness in these methods is the ability of the system against these deceptive
behaviors. In a robust spam detection system, the spam attacker should not be able
to deceive the system even with the complete awareness of the detection mechanism
and performing deceiving behaviors. To our knowledge, no previous research has been
pointed out the robustness issue of spam detection systems against attacks, and it can be
argued that this area of research is still in the early stages. As can be seen in Fig.1, this
paper proposed an unsupervised graph-based method in which the graph nodes include
reviews, reviewers, and products. The proposed method may detect spam attackers in
different scenarios.
For this aim, it calculates the trust score for the reviewer, the honesty score for
reviews, and the reliability score for products; their values are updated in an iterative
algorithm. The reliability score should represent the true reputation value of the prod-
ucts ignoring spammers. The spams and spam attackers are expected to be identified
with having low honesty and trust values. The proposed method is compared with two
other graph-based methods [22, 4]; the results show that the proposed method has im-
proved the system robustness. One challenge to have a complete assessment in spam
detection methods is the lack of an appropriate technique to generate spam reviews;
thus, the paper also developed a simulation tool, which can produce a large number of
reviews tailored to the desired behavior pattern.
The paper continues as follows. In the next section, related works are reviewed.
In section III the motivation and the foundations of the research are presented. The
simulator is described in section IV. Further, the proposed method and algorithm are
presented in section V and section VI respectively. Section VII describes the method
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Figure 1: The interact of different graph nodes
using some case studies, and finally, the paper ends in section VIII with the conclusion
and future works.
2. Related work
Approaches for detecting spam comments are categorized in several ways. Some
divide them into two general types: supervised [7, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21] and unsupervised
methods[1, 4, 12, 23]. However, in some other researches, they are categorized into
three categories: spam reviews, spam attacker, group spam attacker [8].
In the set of spam reviews, the contents of reviews are studied and evaluated. One
of the most important approaches in this category is repeated-based detection. These
methods try to identify spam reviews by going through repetitive patterns of reviews
from the same or different reviewers about similar or different products [11, 15]. In
addition to this, concept repetition can also be introduced as a measurement criterion
for spam comments; the method provided by Alger et al. to identify spam comments
[2]. Doing multiple counterfeit reviews is time consuming and costly. Spam attackers
often do not produce a large number of exclusive counterfeit reviews. They tend to copy
the existing text. Therefore, identifying similar opinions is a central part of detecting
spam comments. Some literature uses a linguistic character in the text of review [3, 19].
In the field of identifying spammers, some methods [1, 4, 23] use inter relationships
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Figure 2: User deceptive behaviour over time
between the review, the reviewer, and product graph, as shown in Fig.1, to identify the
spammer and also compute the trustworthiness of the reviewer, the honesty of review,
and the reliability of the store.
Some researchers believe that spammers use a specific period to generate spam
comments. The numbers of reviews rise dramatically in that interval; thus, they use
burst patterns to identify spam attacker[5, 25] . Some of them, for example, use time
series to identify spammers[9, 26]. Few pieces of research have been yet done in spam-
mer groups identification [17, 24]. The proposed algorithm in the research includes two
steps: 1) the extraction of the repeated pattern, and 2) ranking the group based on the
spam group indices.
3. Motivation and research foundations
Despite the many types of research that have been taken to identify spam comments,
so far, no one has been addressing the issue of spam attacks. Today, smart spammers,
with the knowledge of spam detection methods, can easily deceive the spam detection
system and continue their malicious activity. For example, in text-based systems, Spam
attacker deceives the method by modifying the text of reviews.
Deception can be performed in two manners: 1) deceptive behavior over time (in
length deception), and 2) deceptive behavior over the product (in width deception). In
deceptive behavior over time as can be observed in Fig.2 (the quality of all products
is 5), spam attacker exhibits honest behavior for a while and after gaining enough
4
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trust, discloses its deceitful behavior. It means that smart spammer has a conflicting
behavior over time: honest behavior in the first period to increase his/her credential,
and dishonest behavior in the next period to achieve his/her malicious goals using the
gained social trust.
In contrast to in length deception, in deceptive behavior over the product (in width
deception), the spam attacker exhibits conflicting behavior over different products. As
can be seen an instance of this attack in Fig.3, he sends fake reviews for the product
that wants to slander (here’s product 2), while writing honest reviews on other products
(here’s product 2, 3) to keep its social trust value.
As mentioned earlier, detecting these types of attacks need analyzing the complete
knowledge of nodes behaviors, which are used by graph-based spam detection meth-
ods; however, the current graph-based techniques almost can be deceived via men-
tioned attacks.
4. Simulator software
Since none of the current spam data sets include the spam attacks, and generation
of enough human opinions and performing mentioned attacks are hard in practice, a
Simulation tool has been developed on the basis of PDETool platform[13, 14] to sim-
ulate the spam attack scenarios and evaluate the proposed method. The tool simulates
the reviewing process in an e-Commerce website and can generate enough samples for
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Figure 4: A view of the simulator environment
any given scenario. Moreover, it is capable of simulating any other desired scenario
that may be required in evaluating spam detection methods.
The tool defines the reviewing environment as a graph, which includes two types
of node: 1) product nodes, and 2) reviewer one. Each product has a defined quality.
A reviewer should be connected to a product using connectors to produce a review
scenario. The reviewer nodes have two sub types: honest and spammer reviewers,
which are represented by blue and red users in the tool graphical user interface. The
honest reviewers honestly score the products. To be more specific, their score has
a normal distribution with the mean of product quality and a given variance. The
variance default value is 0.5; however, can be changed by the user. In contrast, the
spammer behavior is defined using a provided script, which enables the modeler to
define any complicated scenario including spam attacks. Moreover, the software is
also capable of defining individual spam behavior for each product. An instance of the
defined mode in this tool is given in Fig.4 As shown in the figure, there are 3 reviewers
and 3 products in this model. The model includes a spam reviewer (the 3rd reviewer)
who falsely scores the last product (i.e., product no 3) across the red connection.
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Table 1: Symbols used in proposed model
Definition Notation
Review v
Reviewer R
Product P
Score of review v v.score
Product of review v v.product
Review of reviewer r r.review
Reviewer of product p p.reviewer
Reviews of product p
by reviewer r
p.r.reviews
The maximum difference
between the
score of reviewer
and the majority
of the community
W
Number of review review.number
5. Proposed model for detecting Spam attacker
In this section, a method for spam and spam attack detection is proposed, which
is robust against mentioned deception scenarios in previous sections. The method is
a graph-based model that is defined by three types of nodes: review, reviewer, and
product. It estimates the value of trustworthiness, honesty, and reliability for these
nodes respectively, which are demarcated in the following in detail. Symbols used in
the formulas are given in Table.1.
Reviewer Trustworthiness: The reviewer’s trust score (denoted by T (r) ) is the
normal honest behavior performed by the user. It is estimated using the honesty mean
of his published reviews and its sequence. The sequence helps the model to give more
weight to recent reviews, which is essential for in length spam attack detection. The
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trust of a reviewer is calculated through the following formula:
T (r) =
∑
∀review∈r.review review.number ∗H(r.review)∑
∀review∈r.review review.number
(1)
Review Honesty: The review’s honesty (denoted by H(v) ) indicates the accuracy
of the opinion. The honesty value is estimated based on its maximum distant from
the estimation of the true quality of the product (i.e., product reliability). The honesty
score is defined as follows:
H(v) = 1−|normalized(v.score)−R(v.product)|W
R(v.product) > 0.5→W = R
R(v.product) < 0.5→W = 1−R
(2)
The honesty score is a value between zero and one. The higher value indicates a
more honest review. The value of one means that the review is perfectly honest since it
fully matches the product reliability. It is not able that the review scores (i.e., v.score
should be normalized in the range [0, 1] before being used in the above equation (in
the case of the systems uses 1-5 scores).
Product Reliability: The reliability score of the product (denoted as R(p)) is the
estimation of the true quality of the product. It depends on both the trust score of the
reviewers and their reviews honesty. The product reliability score is defined as follows.
The score is a value in the range of [0, 1].
R(p) =
∑
r∈p.reviewers
∑
v∈p.r.reviews T (r) ∗H(v) ∗ v.score∑
r∈p.reviewers
∑
v∈p.r.reviews T (r) ∗H(v)
(3)
Iterative Computation Algorithm
As all trustworthiness, honesty, and reliability values are interdependent for esti-
mating them, the mentioned formulas should be computed in a loop until the result
converges to a value. The algorithm output is independent of the initial values of
the nodes (trustworthiness, honesty, and reliability). The proposed algorithm for this
method can be seen in Fig.5.
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Figure 5: The algorithm of the proposed model
6. Deception scenarios and algorithms implementation
In this section, the efficiency of the proposed method (ROSD ) is presented using
some spam attack scenarios. Moreover, the results are compared with other well known
graph-based approaches including Wang’s [23] and Fayazbakhsh’s models [4]. In all
scenarios, 1000 reviews are generated using the simulation tool, and the results of all
three methods are presented and compared. Since the result values for ROSD is [0, 1],
WNG is [-1, +1], and FYZ is [0, 1], the bench marking is done through the following
defined measure: 1) the ability to detect spams and spammers, and 2) the number of
deviations that the spam attacker can create in the actual value of products reliability.
Whatever spam attacker cannot deflect the reliability score of a product from its actual
score indicates a better system performance. It is noteworthy to consider Fayazbakhsh’s
model that calculates only a suspicious score of reviewers and products while has no
solution for calculating the suspicious score of reviews.
6.1. Simple spamming against a product
In the first scenario, the spammer tries to slander a product without any deception
behavior. As can be seen in Fig.6, there are 10 reviewers and three products. The last
reviewer is a spammer who gives zero to product3. In this scenario, spam attacker
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Figure 6: Scenario 1: Simple spamming against a product
wants to slander the product and does not use deception scenario. It is important to
note that the true quality of all products is considered to be 3 out of 5.
The results are shown in Table.2 As it is presented, ROSD and WNG can find a
spammer, while FYZ is unable to detect the spammer as FYZ only tries to find spammer
that sends high score (4 or 5 scores). Also in finding the spam reviews, both of the
models have acceptable results. As can be seen in the last row of Table.2, in all three
models spammer has not been able to change the reliability score of the target product
significantly from the actual quality. Also as shown in Table.3., if spammer simply
publishes positive and fake opinion to promote a product in the same conditions and
the spammer constantly gives the score 5 out of 5 to the corresponding product then the
same results will be achieved. Note that the true quality of the corresponding product
(product3) is considered to be 1 out of 5.
6.2. An over product attack
In the second scenario, an over product attack is simulated. The simulation model
is represented in Fig.7. 8 and is similar to previous ones; however, the spammer is
connected to all products. He gives a right score to all products but the last one. As it
is presented, only the proposed model can find spam attackers, and this suggests that
other models are deceived in this way since they are unable to find the spam attacker.
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Table 2: Results table for the scenario1- slandering a product
Item ROSD WNG FYZ
The average trustworthiness rating of honest reviewer 0.8667 1 0.9975
The average trustworthiness rating of spam attacker 0 -1 0.9916
The average honesty score of non spam reviews 0.8662 0.9238 -
The average honesty score of spam reviews 0 -1 -
The average reliability of target products before spammer 0.6 1 0.9942
The average reliability of target products after spammer 0.6067 1 0.9953
Deviation value in product reliability 0.006 0 0.001
Table 3: Results table for the scenario1- promoting a product
Item ROSD WNG FYZ
The average trustworthiness rating of honest reviewer 0.8789 1 0.9963
The average trustworthiness rating of spam attacker 0 -1 0.9967
The average honesty score of non-spam reviews 0.8759 0.8917 -
The average honesty score of spam reviews 0 -1 -
The average reliability of target products before spammer 0.2 -1 0.9941
The average reliability of target products after spammer 0.1915 -1 0.9954
Deviation value in product reliability 0.0085 0 0.001
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Figure 7: Scenario 2: An over product attack
However, in finding the spam review, both models have acceptable results. As can be
seen in the last row of Table.4, in all three models, spam attacker has not been able
to change the reliability score of the target product critically from the actual quality.
Also, in this scenario, if spam attacker tries to promote a product and using false pos-
itive scores instead of slandering, as indicated in Table.5, the same results have been
achieved (Here the true score of the selected product is assumed to be 1 out of 5).
6.3. An over time attack
In this scenario, a slandering attack over time is simulated. As can be seen in Fig.8,
there are 3 reviewers and 3 products. The last reviewer is spam attacker who gives a
true score of 3 to product 3 in the intervals of time (20 first reviews), and then gives
the score 1 in the intervals of time (20-second reviews); this process continues until the
end of the review generation. It should be noted that the true quality of all products is
considered to be 3 out of 5.
As illustrated in Table.6, in this scenario results are similar to the earlier scenario,
and the proposed model only may detect spam attacker. The results for promoting
attack over time are the same; it is shown in Table.7.
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Table 4: Results table for the scenario 2- Selective product slandering
Item ROSD WNG FYZ
The average trustworthiness rating of honest reviewer 0.8719 1 0.9960
The average trustworthiness rating of spam attacker 0.5730 1 0.9966
The average honesty score of non spam reviews 0.8684 0.9171 -
The average honesty score of spam reviews 0 -1 -
The average reliability of target products before spammer 0.6 1 0.9965
The average reliability of target products after spammer 0.6060 1 0.9952
Deviation value in product reliability 0.006 0 0.0013
Table 5: Results table for the scenario 2- Selective product promoting
Item ROSD WNG FYZ
The average trustworthiness rating of honest reviewer 0.8704 1 0.9961
The average trustworthiness rating of spam attacker 0.5865 1 0.9962
The average honesty score of non spam reviews 0.8726 0.8985 -
The average honesty score of spam reviews 0 -1 -
The average reliability of target products before spammer 0.2 -1 0.9935
The average reliability of target products after spammer 0.2016 -1 0.9952
Deviation value in product reliability 0.0016 0 0.002
13
Figure 8: Scenario 3: An over time attack
Table 6: Results table for the scenario3- slandering attack over time
Item ROSD WNG FYZ
The average trustworthiness rating of honest reviewers 0.8651 1 0.9814
The average trustworthiness rating of spam attacker 0.5285 1 0.9890
The average honesty score of non spam reviews 0.9081 0.8694 -
The average honesty score of spam reviews 0.3486 -1 -
The average reliability of target products before spammer 0.6 1 1
The average reliability of target products after spammer 0.5736 1 0.9816
Deviation value in product reliability 0.0264 0 0.0184
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Table 7: Results table for the scenario3- promoting attack over time
Item ROSD WNG FYZ
The average trustworthiness rating of honest reviewers 0.8678 1 0.9900
The average trustworthiness rating of spam attacker 0.5570 1 0.9926
The average honesty score of non spam reviews 0.9081 0.8694 -
The average honesty score of spam reviews 0.3486 -1 -
The average reliability of target products before spammer 0.6 1 1
The average reliability of target products after spammer 0.6181 1 0.9868
Deviation value in product reliability 0.0181 0 0.0132
6.4. Selective product slandering with real data
In this scenario, an over product attack on real data is implemented. 20 spam data
records have been artificially added to an existing spam data set to reach this goal [6].
This data set is the opinions collected from the movie Lenz website and includes 16
reviewers and 670 products. To emulate the deception scenario in this data, a spam
attacker is added to the data that gives 0.5 (the lowest score in real data is 0.5) to some
goal products and sends the correct score (similar to honest reviews) to other products.
The average score of the attacker’s target products is about 3.75, so his reviews should
definitely be identified as spam. The results are shown in Table.8 As it is presented,
only the proposed model can find spam attackers, and in the case of finding the spam
review, both models have acceptable results. However, as can be seen in the last row of
Table 8, in the proposed model, FYZ spam attacker has not been able to change greatly
the reliability score of the target product from the actual quality.
6.5. Selective product promoting with real data
In this scenario, all the condition is the same as the previous scenario; however, to
emulate the deception scenario in this data, a spam attacker is added to the data that
gives 5 (the highest score in real data is 5) to some goal products and sends the correct
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Table 8: Results table for the scenario 4
Item ROSD WNG FYZ
The average trustworthiness rating of honest reviewer 0.9103 0.9307 1
The average trustworthiness rating of spam attacker 0.5596 0.9682 1
The average honesty score of non spam reviews 0.9140 0.3823 -
The average honesty score of spam reviews 0.1167 -0.1245 -
The average reliability of target products before spammer 0.9106 0.8230 1
The average reliability of target products after spammer 0.8604 0.2506 1
Deviation value in product reliability 0.0502 0.5724 0
score (similar to honest reviews) to other products. The average score of the attacker’s
target products is about 1.5, so his reviews should definitely be identified as spam. As
before only the proposed model performs well Table.9.
7. Conclusion
Given the growing importance of users’ comments in the virtual world, providing
a robust method for detecting smart spam attackers is indispensable. In this paper, a
model that would be robust against various types of spam deception behaviors has been
proposed. The efficiency of the proposed method is studied in some attack scenarios
and compared with two famous and well known models in this area. The results show
that not only the proposed model can find spam attacker in every deception scenario,
but also has a considerable improvement over the other model. It is capable of detecting
the spammer and decreasing its trust. Moreover, it does not allow the attacker to deviate
the product reputation to his malicious goals. As future work, it could be useful to
implement more deceptive scenarios on review spam detection models and resist the
currently proposed model against other deceptive scenarios.
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Table 9: Results table for the scenario 5
Item ROSD WNG FYZ
The average trustworthiness rating of honest reviewer 0.9119 0.9307 1
The average trustworthiness rating of spam attacker 0.5015 0.9886 1
The average honesty score of non spam reviews 0.9154 0.3844 -
The average honesty score of spam reviews 0 -0.024 -
The average reliability of target products before spammer 0.2053 -0.6484 1
The average reliability of target products after spammer 0.2053 0.3760 1
Deviation value in product reliability 0 1.022 0
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